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Abstract 
 
A number of different proposals to reform the House of Lords have been outlined since the 
Labour government pledged to reform the second chamber in 1997. This paper seeks to 
explore the various characteristics of the reformed second chamber that different actors 
involved in the reform process have said they wished to achieve. These characteristics are 
contexualised with reference to some of the literature on the role and purpose of second 
chambers within the political system, and the types of issues that need attention in terms of a 
reformed House of Lords. This analysis draws particular attention to the question of the 
legitimacy of the reformed second chamber, which helps illuminate how the current cycle of 
Lords’ reform has resulted in various unintended consequences. Finally, the paper looks at the 
extent to which the issue of House of Lords reform has been kicked into the constitutional 
long-grass. 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper is a work in progress, and must not be cited without permission. 
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Introduction 
 
House of Lords reform has, for well over a century, perplexed the nation’s politicians, incited 
journalists to near apoplectic criticism, and kept a clutch of academics gainfully employed in 
explaining what it all means. It is to this puzzle of the British constitution that this paper turns 
its attention. Although the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949 curtailed the powers of the 
second chamber, limited progress has been made in reforming its composition. Although 
changes such as the 1958 Life Peerages Act seemed a step in the ‘right’ direction, fault could 
still be found with the hereditary membership inside the House of Lords. In its 1997 election 
manifesto, the Labour Party pledged to reform the House of Lords, but beyond this one 
statement of fact observers part company in terms of their agreed analysis about current 
efforts to reform the second chamber.  
 
Readers will be pleased to discover that this paper does not intend to rehearse the bizarre story 
of House of Lords reform since 1997 (for such a story, see Kelso (2004, 2005), and also 
Cockerell (2001), Shell (2000, 2004), McLean, Spirling & Russell (2003)). Its angle is 
somewhat different, instead aiming to explore the characteristics of the reformed chamber that 
different actors involved in the process have said they wish to achieve. These characteristics 
are contextualised with reference to some of the academic literature on the role and purpose of 
second chambers within the political system, and the types of issues that need attention in 
terms of a reformed House of Lords. This analysis draws particular attention to the question 
of the legitimacy of the reformed second chamber, which helps illuminate how the current 
cycle of Lords’ reform has resulted in various unintended consequences. Finally, the paper 
looks at the extent to which the issue of House of Lords reform has been kicked into the 
constitutional long-grass.  
 
 
Visions for the Second Chamber 
 
At each discrete stage of the recent attempt to reform the House of Lords, those involved have 
attempted to outline the kind of chamber they wish to see emerge from the reform process. 
This section will examine the relationship between the proposed characteristics and the 
proposed reforms, in an effort to locate the recent discussion about Lords’ reform in the wider 
context of the perceived position of second chambers within the political system. The aim is 
not to analyse every single document produced on the topic, but to focus instead on those that 
have shaped the path of Lords’ reform since 1997. 
 
The Labour Party Manifesto Commitment 
The analysis begins with the Labour Party’s 1997 election manifesto. This promised ‘an 
initial, self-contained reform, not dependent on further reform in the future,’ that would 
remove the right of hereditary peers to sit and vote in the House of Lords (Labour Party 
1997). This was to be ‘the first stage in a process of reform to make the House of Lords more 
democratic and representative’. The House of Lords Act 1999 banished the hereditary peers 
from the second chamber, with the exception of 92 individuals who were granted indefinite 
clemency as the result of a compromise deal made between the government and the 
Conservative peers. Two points are raised here. First, removing the hereditary peers alone 
does not necessarily contribute to a more democratic or representative second chamber. The 
House of Lords Act must instead be viewed as an effort at modernisation, rather than reform, 
and as one that sat rather comfortably with the New Labour government’s commitment to 
modernisation more generally. Second, the Act obviously forms part of a bridge that links into 
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the second stage of Lords’ reform, in that it would be ridiculous to argue for a more 
democratic or representative second chamber without first removing the hereditary peers. The 
problem with this point is that 92 of those hereditary peers were permitted to stay until the 
second stage of reform had been negotiated. However, eight years after Labour’s pledge on 
Lords’ reform, a second stage has yet to materialise. In the absence of such a second stage, a 
rather ad hoc set of arrangements has fallen into place to address the membership of the 
Lords. The nature of these arrangements will not detain us here, but they include, briefly, a 
non-statutory Appointments Commission to select non-political peers (the so-called ‘People’s 
Peers’), along with appointments made by the prime minister. Again, although these 
mechanisms are only supposed to be temporary until the second stage of reform is 
consolidated, the length of time that has passed without the continuation of reform forces a 
number of conclusions. First, it is unclear that appointed members help improve the 
democratic credentials of the second chamber. It is possible to argue that the Appointments 
Commission at least removes some of the power of patronage involved in choosing life peers, 
although one must of course then ask who chooses the members of the Appointments 
Commission (for more detail, see Appointments Commission 2004:2). In addition, 
appointment by the prime minister might also be more democratic than having hereditary 
peers, because at least the prime minister is himself a democratically elected member of the 
lower chamber. These are, however, difficult arguments to sustain in terms of moving towards 
a more democratic second chamber. There are also problems in terms of the interim House 
constituting a move towards a more representative second chamber, as demonstrated by the 
statistics from the Annual Report 2003/04 from the Appointments Commission 
(Appointments Commission 2004:19). There have been improvements in terms of attracting 
ethnic minorities to seek appointment, with the rates of nomination from both Asian and black 
individuals running at twice their proportion in the wider population. However, numbers are 
perilously low for women, who make up 51 per cent of the UK population, but less than 20 
per cent of the nominations. Problems are also evident in terms of age, with those over 60 
seeking nomination at a much higher rate than their proportion in the population, and with an 
over-representation of those from London and the south east. These statistics do not include 
information about the employment background of nominees, but the actual appointments 
made in 2001 and 2004 demonstrate that individuals are seemingly still being drawn from the 
same kinds of backgrounds that have traditionally preceded a career in politics. Of course, this 
gets onto difficult conceptual ground about the nature of representation and the type of 
representative that is required for the second chamber, and which would more usefully form 
the basis of a separate paper. Furthermore, when comparing the nomination statistics with the 
individuals subsequently nominated, it is possible to argue that the Appointments 
Commission is at least attempting to improve the representativeness of those appointed, by, 
for example, appointing proportionately more women than were nominated. Again, however, 
this type of analysis belongs in a separate paper. 
 
The Royal Commission 
The Royal Commission on Reform of the House of Lords, chaired by Lord Wakeham, 
explored the potential for a more democratic and representative chamber in a little more 
depth. The Commission noted it wished to see three main characteristics possessed by the 
reformed second chamber, arguing it should be ‘authoritative, confident, and broadly 
representative of the whole of British society’ (Cm 4535, 1999-2000: 6). It outlined four 
particular roles that the reformed chamber should perform (Cm 4535, 1999-2000: 3). First, it 
should ‘bring a range of different perspectives to bear on the development of public policy’. 
Second, it should be broadly representative of British society. Third, it should act as one of 
the main ‘checks and balances within the unwritten British constitution’. Finally, it should 
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‘provide a voice for the nations and regions of the United Kingdom’. The Commission did not 
see any need for new powers for the second chamber. With these characteristics and roles in 
mind, the Commission rejected the idea of a wholly or largely elected chamber, and proposed 
instead that a chamber of 550 members be comprised with a significant minority of regional 
members, and the remaining portion being chosen by an independent Appointments 
Commission. The report also outlined three different models for selecting the regional 
members: at the general election, chosen by complementary election; or at the European 
Parliament elections (there were two different versions of this method). The Commission 
referred back to the Labour manifesto claim about securing a more democratic and more 
representative chamber to justify its recommendations. In terms of producing a more 
democratic chamber, the proposals would produce a House that would ‘reflect the overall 
balance of political opinion within the country’. In terms of producing a more representative 
chamber, the result would be a House that contained ‘members from all parts of the country 
and from all walks of life’ (Cm 4535, 1999-2000: 9). The Royal Commission’s conclusions 
were eviscerated in the press upon publication, mainly because of the type of election that 
they recommended. Indeed, the Commission’s defence of its conclusion in terms of 
promoting a more democratic chamber are tenuous, and actually seem to be another way of 
saying the chamber will be more representative. Indeed, the characteristics outlined for the 
reformed chamber have a great deal to do with securing a more representative chamber but 
almost nothing to do with securing a democratic one. Nevertheless, the Royal Commission 
was addressing the issue of legitimacy of the second chamber through their recommendations, 
although they did it somewhat obliquely by arguing for a more ‘authoritative’ House. It 
believed this enhanced authority would come through the direct regional representation, and 
argued that ‘a more broadly representative membership could provide a vigorous alternative 
source of authority for the second chamber without threatening the democratic authority of the 
House of Commons’.  
 
The Government White Paper 
The government did not proceed with the recommendations of the Royal Commission, and 
instead published a white paper in November 2001 that took reform in a slightly different 
direction (Cm 5291, 2001-2002). It noted four characteristics for the reformed chamber. First, 
it should be a revising and deliberating assembly. Second, its membership should be 
appropriate for those functions and not be a clone of the House of Commons. Third, it should 
have a political outlook, but not be dominated by one party. Finally, the chamber should be 
representative of independent expertise in the UK (Cm 5291, 2001-2002: para.8). The white 
paper’s recommendations for composition were quite different to those of the Royal 
Commission. It proposed a chamber of 600 members. Of these, 120 would be non-party 
members selected by the Appointments Commission, 120 would be directly elected, 332 
would be nominated by the political parties, and the remainder would draw on the bishops and 
law lords (Cm 5291, 2001-2002: para.64). Again, it is possible to argue that these proposals 
do contribute to a chamber that is more democratic, since even a small minority of directly 
elected members is clearly more democratic than none at all. In addition, the assumption 
would also be that the Appointments Commission nominations and the party nominations 
would be made with reference to the goal of creating a more representative chamber. 
However, the high proportion of non-elected members proposed by the white paper does raise 
questions about the extent to which the Labour government was committed to a more 
democratic second chamber at that point. 
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The Public Administration Committee 
The Public Administration Committee also got into the business of House of Lords reform 
with its report of February 2002, by way of responding to the government’s white paper of 
November 2001. It wanted to see a reformed second chamber with three particular 
characteristics: a composition distinct from that of the first chamber; adequate powers to make 
an impact; and perceived legitimacy to use its powers (HC 494, 2001-2002; para.8). The 
Public Administration Committee took the issue of legitimacy particularly seriously, arguing 
that both the government (through its white paper) and the Royal Commission had been 
mistaken in assuming that ‘advances for one chamber are inevitably threats to the other’ (HC 
494, 2001-2002: para.36). It argued that the task should be to reform the second chamber in a 
way that strengthened parliament as a whole in terms of its relationship with the executive. 
The Committee argued that the role, powers and functions of the second chamber were ‘not in 
dispute’ but that a centre of gravity had to be found over the issue of composition (HC 494, 
2001-2002: para.38). The Committee specifically linked the issue of legitimacy to that of 
democracy, as opposed to that of representation, like the Royal Commission had done. The 
Committee made a distinction between the ‘overall legitimacy of the institution, and the 
legitimacy of individual members’. It noted its belief that ‘the former does require a 
sufficiently firm basis in election, or the institution will never be taken seriously enough; but 
that once this is established there need be no difference in legitimacy between members 
drawn from different sources’ (HC 494, 2001-2002: para.68). This analysis, in conjunction 
with the survey it had conducted with MPs on the matter, led the Committee to recommend 
that a centre of gravity could be found in support for a mixed chamber. This chamber would 
be 60 per cent elected, 20 per cent nominated by political parties, and 20 per cent comprised 
of independent members, with both latter categories being formally appointed by the 
Appointments Commission (HC 494, 2001-2002: para.96). The elected portion of the House 
would derive from the regional constituencies used for European Parliament elections, using a 
proportional system (HC 494, paras.106-112). 
 
The Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform 
The government did not proceed with its white paper from November 2001, and a Joint 
Committee of the two Houses of Parliament was eventually established to explore the matter 
(such a committee had been promised in the 1997 manifesto, but the Royal Commission had 
been appointed in its place). It was given clear instructions to bring forward a range of 
recommendations for the composition of the reformed chamber. The Joint Committee noted 
five characteristics it wished to see in such a chamber: legitimacy, representativeness, no 
domination by any one party, independence, and expertise (HC 171, 2002-2003: para.30). It 
recommended that there be votes in each House on seven options for the reformed 
composition, ranging from fully appointed to fully elected, and including mixed proportions 
of appointment and election in between (para.62). As in the past, these listed characteristics 
do not make any specific reference to a chamber with democratic characteristics, although 
that of representativeness is clearly included. What does make an appearance in the desired 
characteristics is that of legitimacy. Certainly, the Royal Commission had referred to this 
issue in terms of an ‘authoritative’ chamber, and the Public Administration Committee had 
been quite clear that the reformed second chamber had to have the legitimacy to engage with 
all aspects of its parliamentary role. The Joint Committee continued to explore this matter, 
noting that the arguments surrounding the issue of the composition of the second chamber 
indicated that there were many ‘routes to legitimacy’, not only the democratic one. It 
concluded that the existing House of Lords already exhibited three of the characteristics the 
Committee wished to see, namely lack of domination by one party, independence and 
expertise. It argued that ‘if these existing qualities, bolstered by a greater representativeness, 
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can be transferred to the reformed House, we believe that a new legitimacy … will naturally 
develop’ (HC 171, 2002-2003: para.43). Therefore, whereas the Public Administration 
Committee believed that the democratic component was essential to the legitimacy of the 
second chamber, the Joint Committee were more inclined to link it to the issue of 
representation. 
 
The Cross-Party Private Members’ Bill 
The seven options put forward by the Joint Committee were voted upon in the Houses of 
Parliament in February 2003. The Lords voted overwhelmingly for a wholly appointed second 
chamber, but the Commons failed to find a majority for any one option. There has been a 
great deal of dithering on the topic since then. In September 2003, the government announced 
plans to remove the remaining hereditary peers and establish the Appointments Commission 
on a firmer footing (CP 14/03, 2003). By this time, the proposal to make the Lords ‘more 
democratic and representative’ had been replaced with a desire to make it ‘more legitimate 
and more representative’ (CP 14/03, 2003; introduction), once more making plain that the 
government now believed legitimacy stemmed largely from representative credentials, not 
democratic ones. However, it announced in March 2004 that it would not proceed with these 
plans, primarily because of mounting divisions in the PLP on the way forward. Despite this 
inaction by the government in terms of proceeding to the second stage of reform, other MPs 
have continued to lobby for change. In February 2005, Paul Tyler’s bill on reforming the 
Lords (Bill 60) was given its first reading in the Commons (HC Debs., 10 February 2005, 
vol.430, col.1679). The bill is the product of a cross-party group of senior MPs: Kenneth 
Clarke, Robin Cook, Tony Wright, George Young and (obviously) Paul Tyler. These are 
fairly heavyweight politicians as far as Lords’ reform is concerned, and all of them have 
previously been involved in arguing for a democratic base to the second chamber. Tyler’s bill, 
which will receive its second reading on 8 April 2005, is based on the original Labour 
promise to make the Lords more democratic and representative 
(www.paultyler.libdems.org/content/view/215/2/). It proposes a 70 per cent elected House, with 
members elected through the single transferable vote on open lists, and serving for twelve-
year terms, with a third of the House standing down every four years. The supremacy of the 
Commons would not be challenged, because the remaining portion would be chosen by a 
statutory appointments commission. The mixed membership would, the group argue, secure a 
more democratic and representative House, giving the chamber the democratic legitimacy 
required to fulfil the tasks expected of a second chamber, while still ensuring that the pre-
eminence of the lower house be preserved.  
 
Regardless of any success enjoyed by Paul Tyler’s private members’ bill on 8 April 2005, the 
fact remains that the Labour government has not secured the second stage in reforming the 
House of Lords, and has not even completed the first stage, given the continued presence of 
some hereditary peers. Indeed, part of the reason why the proposals to remove those peers and 
consolidate the Appointments Commission were resisted was that some Labour MPs were 
concerned that this would itself constitute the second stage, and that a more democratic and 
representative chamber would thereafter take even longer to establish. However, the 
preceding discussion has demonstrated that, despite a profusion of options for the second 
stage of reform, those options have been torn over the desirability of a democratically 
constituted second chamber and its potential impact upon the supremacy of the first chamber. 
This has, in turn, led some of those options to emphasise the merits of representativeness, 
independence and expertise in terms of their contribution to legitimacy, and to dismiss the 
democratic options as inimical to the conditions required for a balanced and functioning 
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political system. However, the academic literature on the topic of House of Lords reform 
suggests that a different approach might be in order. 
 
 
The Bigger Picture in House of Lords Reform 
 
Many of the suggestions made about how to reform the House of Lords since 1997 have been 
based on the desire to preserve the strengths of the current second chamber while also 
addressing its weaknesses. Such an approach is of course simple common sense, not least 
because there is zero chance of initiating a reform process that discarded the second chamber 
in its entirety and started again from scratch. In addition, the current House of Lords does 
indeed have several strengths that add considerable value to parliament as an institution. As 
the preceding discussion highlighted, many actors were keen to preserve the expertise of the 
life peers, and also the relative independence and lack of partisanship exhibited there, 
particularly now that no one party dominates the Lords. The expertise and independence of 
the House of Lords have prompted praise about its performance in comparison with the 
Commons, particularly in terms of its high quality debates, its scrutiny of legislation, and its 
engagement with complex, controversial and technical issues (e.g. Shell & Beamish 1992, 
Baldwin 1999, Brazier 1999). In short, through its work, the House of Lords, certainly since 
the late 1960s, has become a functionally legitimate part of the political system, even if it has 
not been democratically legitimate. This is why many of the reform proposals for the House 
of Lords have made clear stipulations that neither the powers nor the role of the current 
second chamber need examination. In other words, the House of Lords does an excellent job 
within parliament, but is let down by the nature of its membership. The reform proposals 
therefore envisage a future where the second chamber does exactly the same things it does 
just now, and exercises exactly the same powers in relation to the Commons, but has a 
membership that is composed on a different basis. The aim is to match the functional 
legitimacy of the current House with enhanced representational legitimacy, and in some cases, 
democratic legitimacy, so that the reformed House can do the job it currently does on a more 
legitimate footing. There are at least two problems with this approach. 
 
 
The Purpose of the Second Chamber 
 
Advocates for reforming the composition of the second chamber have tended to assume that 
the roles currently performed by the Lords are satisfactory, and have overlooked the potential 
for reassessing these roles. Rather than focus primarily on the issue of who should be in the 
second chamber, there is a strong argument for starting the analysis by probing what it is the 
chamber is supposed to do. Despite the clear evidence that the House of Lords performs its 
functions well, there is still a case for exploring in more detail both its actual and potential 
roles, not least in response to the constitutional changes that have been visited upon the UK 
political system since 1997.  
 
The argument about looking at roles before composition is not new (Mount 1992:188-9; 
Russell 2000:260). Russell (2000:260-294) in particular has explored the various roles that the 
reformed second chamber might fulfil and used these to determine its membership 
requirements. To an extent, these roles reflect the kind of work that the House has been doing 
anyway. For example, one of those roles is that of a revising and review chamber, which is 
one of the things that has attracted commendation for the Lords in the past. Nevertheless, 
there are a few aspects to this job that the chamber has not performed tremendously well. 
Most notably, in terms of scrutiny, the House has not been enormously successful in asking 
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government to think again about its legislation (Russell 2000:274). On one level, governments 
do rely on the second chamber for detailed scrutiny of their bills. However, whenever the 
House of Lords has defeated high profile government legislation, this has provoked the 
response that the chamber, lacking democratic legitimacy as it does, is not in a position to 
challenge the elected House (or, more accurately, the government). As such, this is a role that 
the House has struggled to perform well, and is therefore one that is worth some examination 
in the context of reforming the Lords. This point will be developed later. Russell has also 
explored how the reformed Lords could play a role as a guardian of the constitution, with 
particular reference to potential roles in amending the constitution and overseeing the 
progress of human rights legislation. The current House has a limited role in constitutional 
matters, and Russell (2000:282) rightly notes that if it were to assume more responsibility in 
this area, its membership would need to include specific characteristics. Finally, there is also 
the potential for a territorial chamber, that would build upon the devolution settlement, and 
bind the nations and regions, and perhaps their respective assemblies, into the UK parliament 
(Russell 2000:283).  
 
The three major roles performed by second chambers outlined by Russell, and summarised 
above, would, if explored and embedded into a reformed second chamber, undoubtedly add 
value to the work of parliament. In short, these types of roles would all contribute to defining 
a second chamber that complemented the first chamber. It has been a long-standing concern 
of parliamentary reformers that the second chamber, when reformed, should not compete with 
the first chamber, and this of course makes perfect institutional sense. However, the problem 
thus far has been that reformers have primarily been interested in ensuring that the Lords does 
not compete with the Commons with reference to schemes for composition that ensure the 
second chamber is deemed to be less legitimate (mainly less democratically legitimate) than 
the first chamber. Complementarity has thus been pursued through different methods of 
composing the chamber. However, different methods of composition are only one way of 
securing complementary chambers. Ensuring that each chamber performs different roles is 
perhaps more important, and has the added benefit of ensuring that parliament as a whole 
functions to the best of its ability. The purpose of a second chamber is not, as is often the view 
in some parliamentary circles, to play a lesser sibling to the first chamber. Rather, it is to fulfil 
particular roles and functions that are distinct to those of the first chamber, so that when taken 
together, these roles and functions ensure that an effective parliament is in place to scrutinise 
the government and hold it to account.  
 
While this may seem like common sense derived from any legislative studies textbook, it has 
nevertheless apparently eluded many of those involved in actually bringing forward plans to 
reform the second chamber. As was noted in the first section, the various proposals for reform 
have all focused on composition and proclaimed the roles and functions of the second 
chamber to be quite in order. Even when there has been an analysis of the role of the second 
chamber, such as conducted by the Royal Commission, the conclusion has been that there is 
no need to change the way these roles are performed. In addition, there has been almost 
universal consensus that there is no need to alter the powers of the second chamber either. 
These points lead us to the second problem derived from the way in which reformers view the 
reform process. 
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The Dynamics of Change in a Reformed Second Chamber 
 
To reiterate, the argument that the current House of Lords performs its roles well and is not in 
need of further powers forms a central strand of the proposals that have been made regarding 
reform in recent years. These proposals have instead argued that the main focus should be on 
making the composition of the second chamber more legitimate, with arguments ranging 
between the need for more democratic legitimacy and the need for more representational 
legitimacy. The reformed House would, in this view, continue to do the same job, with the 
same powers, that it does now, but with a more acceptable, rational and legitimate 
composition. 
 
The idea that it is possible to change significantly the composition of the House while 
preserving its roles and powers is misguided. It is based on a flawed assumption that 
composition, roles and powers are only interrelated at a cosmetic level, when the relationship 
between them is actually fundamental to the whole nature and character of the House. 
Changing one of these in a major way will undoubtedly impact upon the other two. There are 
a couple of points to make about this observation. 
 
The first point is one that has been made by those who are opposed to a democratic 
component to the second chamber. Some of those who oppose a democratic House of Lords 
do so because it would challenge the legitimacy of the House of Commons. Many also note 
that an elected second chamber would lose some of its expertise and independence, and 
therefore be less able to perform the key roles at which it currently excels (see debates on the 
seven options for reform, HC Debs., 21 January 2003, vol.398; HL Debs., 21-22 January 
2003, vol.643). This argument clearly acknowledges that making significant changes to one 
characteristic of the House – that is, making its composition more democratic – will have a 
considerable knock-on effect on other characteristics, notably in terms of its ability to carry 
out its various functions. Those who oppose a democratic Lords on the grounds that it would 
thereafter be able to challenge the Commons are also making a similar point. They argue that 
changing one characteristic impacts upon the other, in this case, that a democratically 
composed Lords would consider itself entitled to use its powers to thwart the lower house. 
Those in favour of democratic change have obviously contested the logic of these two 
arguments, and reject the idea that an elected Lords would be unable to perform its functions 
or be obsessed with challenging the Commons. Yet, the relationship between the second 
chamber’s characteristics has more substantial implications. 
 
Changes in the way the second chamber performs its roles and uses its powers will be the 
inevitable result of any kind of change in composition, whether it has a democratic basis or 
not. The introduction of life peers in 1958, for example, brought about a profound change in 
the ethos and status of the House (Rush 1999:11). The House became more professional in its 
outlook, and its expertise expanded thanks to the influx of life peers from a range of 
professions (Wheeler-Booth 2003:641). The performance of its various roles improved 
because of the nature of the new additions to its composition. A similar kind of change has 
been in evidence since 1999, with the removal of the bulk of the hereditary peers. As the 
appendix illustrates, the number of government defeats in the Lords has been relatively high 
since 1999, and of the four times the Parliament Acts have been invoked since 1949, three 
have been since 1999. There are of course many inter-related reasons why this is the case, 
such as initially poor legislation, and the government’s insistence on subsequently reversing 
Lords’ amendments has not improved the atmosphere between the Houses (Shell 2004:852). 
However, the fundamental reason why this pattern of heightened second chamber activism 
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has emerged is because the second chamber, minus its hereditary membership, considers itself 
to be possessed of the legitimacy required to use the powers it has. The House is no more 
democratic than it was prior to 1999, thus dispensing with the argument that only an elected 
Lords would challenge the supremacy of the Commons (or government). Any realignment in 
one characteristic cannot help but prompt realignments elsewhere. In this respect, the 
argument that an indirectly elected or appointed chamber is better than a directly elected one, 
because the former two would not challenge the first chamber, is misconceived. Any type of 
newly composed second chamber, whether elected, nominated, or a hybrid of the two, would 
be likely to probe the boundaries of its powers. This would not be the result of its 
composition, but because that composition would have been the result of a reform process that 
itself bestowed legitimacy on the second chamber, regardless of whether it was a process led 
by government or by parliament itself.   
 
There is a precedent to support this argument. After the failed reform attempt of 1968-69, the 
House of Lords, and the life peers in particular, busied themselves by establishing the 
committees and scrutiny instruments that now attract so much commendation. The House was 
still possessed of a hereditary component that endured criticism, but it had not been the Lords 
who had been in the way of reform – rather, it had been the Commons that had been unable to 
find a consensus for change (Shell 1988:20). A significant portion of the second chamber had 
been in favour of some kind of compositional reform, and, as it had been the Commons that 
got in the way of securing that reform, the peers felt no compunction about improving the way 
they fulfilled their various functions. In this regard, the Lords, and particularly the life peers, 
perceived a legitimate role for the second chamber in improving its functional capacity in the 
absence of broader reform. To put it another way, its functional legitimacy stemmed from and 
was developed in the context of the fact that it had not been the Lords who had prevented 
reform from proceeding. In the current context, the House of Lords, which is now comprised 
largely of appointed members, arguably sees itself as a more legitimate part of the political 
system than it did prior to 1999. It acquiesced in the removal of the hereditary peers, and 
reached a clear view in February 2003 that the reformed second chamber should be appointed 
in nature. As in 1969, it was again the House of Commons that could not make up its mind 
about what it wanted to see at the end of the reform process. The Lords is still technically in 
the interim phase, but the partial completion of stage one has evidently convinced the House 
that it has sufficient increased legitimacy, from the process of reform itself, to change the way 
it performs its functions and the way in which it uses its powers.  
 
The use of the Parliament Act to secure the Hunting Bill in 2004 is testament to this. The 
function of asking the government to think again is, as Russell (2000:262) argues, a crucial 
one that the chamber has struggled to perform. The appendix indicates that the second 
chamber has endeavoured to improve its abilities in this regard. Of more importance, perhaps, 
is that it has also been analysing its powers and how it uses them. Although the Parliament 
Acts stipulate the second chamber’s powers, a lot also rests on convention, and the most 
famous of these is the Salisbury Convention, which indicates that the House of Lords should 
not block legislation contained in the governing party’s manifesto. The Lords’ opposition to 
the Hunting Bill indicates that it is clearly reconsidering the merits of such a convention. 
These types of ‘understanding’ may have held when the second chamber knew its 
composition was questionable, but not when it has begun to be rationalised. The important 
point is that the rationalisation that has thus far occurred has not been in a necessarily 
democratic direction. An appointed chamber, whose appointment is apparently in keeping 
with the wishes of at least the government, if not of the whole of parliament, will consider 
itself able to explore its roles and powers with a degree of legitimacy.  
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Of course, it is important to distinguish between the House of Lords perceiving itself to be 
more legitimate, and everyone else seeing it that way. This distinction between internal and 
external legitimacy ensures that the search for an acceptable composition goes on. The House 
of Lords may see itself as more legitimate as a result of what reform has taken place, but the 
public will continue to rate the chamber’s legitimacy, or lack thereof, in terms of how it has 
been composed. In this regard, it is useful to draw an important distinction between what has 
been argued here, and what Russell (2003) has argued. In exploring the notion that, in its 
current state, the House of Lords might already be considered reformed, Russell argues that 
the removal of the hereditary peers and the party imbalance has given the second chamber the 
sense of perceived legitimacy required to assert itself more fully. That is undoubtedly true, 
and this complements the argument made here that, despite the actual content of reform, it is 
the reform process itself that fosters this perceived legitimacy. However, just because the 
House of Lords sees itself as more legitimate now, despite remaining in an interim phase, 
does not mean that everyone else will agree. Polling has demonstrated consistently a public 
preference for a largely elected second chamber. The Royal Commission, for example, 
pointed to the inherently contradictory evidence it received during its public consultations, 
noting that while many wanted to preserve independence and expertise, they still wanted an 
elected chamber (Cm 4534, 1999-2000; Wheeler-Booth 2003:659). The government’s white 
paper consultations from late 2001 indicated that 89 per cent of those responding argued for a 
second chamber with at least 50 per cent of its membership elected (Analysis of Consultation 
Responses, May 2002, www.dca.gov.uk/constitution/holref/holrefresp/holrefresp.htm). While 
the House may have been recently displaying the kind of independence and expertise required 
of a second chamber, that does not mean the public regard its composition as any more 
legitimate than before. Although there is much to the argument that there are different routes 
to legitimacy, the simple fact remains that, from a public perspective, the chamber is either 
democratic or it is not. The perceptions of the Lords themselves that they are more legitimate 
as a result of the reform process that has thus far occurred, and the kind of chamber it has left 
in its wake, is not sufficient in the longer term. The continued ability, and tendency, of the 
Commons to question the role of the Lords because it is not elected will ensure this.  
 
Nevertheless, attempting to look at the composition of the chamber alone is not sufficient, 
regardless of whether the preferred option is elected, appointed, or a mixture of the two. 
Tinkering with one of the triumvirate of characteristics – composition – will necessarily lead 
to a re-balancing in the other two – roles and powers. Complementarity with the first chamber 
can only be secured if all three characteristics are complementary. This includes securing an 
understanding between the two Houses that the role of asking the government to think again 
about its legislation is an important one, and that when the second chamber fulfils it, it is not 
necessarily also seeking to challenge the government or the Commons. That understanding 
cannot come through a reformed composition alone, but must be accompanied by clarity 
about the roles of the second chamber and the powers it has to fulfil them. However, so long 
as the reform process is viewed in one-dimensional terms, rather than in three-dimensional 
terms, the current perceptions about what is and what is not legitimate work for the second 
chamber to engage with will persist. 
 
 
The Unintended Consequences of Reform 
 
The recent debacles over hunting and anti-terrorism legislation demonstrate the unintended 
consequences of the stalled process of House of Lords reform. When there seemed to be no 
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real movement towards a second stage of reform once most of the hereditary peers had been 
removed, the concern was that the interim House was worse than what it had replaced. At 
least with a majority of hereditary peers in place, the second chamber retained its 
independence, along with its expertise. In the interim stage, the House was filled with the pre-
existing life peers, supplemented by new life peers, leading to the oft-vocalised complaint that 
the chamber would soon be filled with Tony’s cronies. In this view, regardless of the expertise 
possessed by the House, its independence had surely been compromised.  
 
These fears have not really been borne out. The process of reform itself, stalled or not, has 
given the House some the legitimacy it has required in order to become more fully engaged 
with the political process. The Lords’ opposition to the recent hunting legislation and anti-
terrorism legislation are products of this perceived legitimacy. That legitimacy has given the 
Lords’ an incentive to reassess how it performs its roles, in this case, the role of asking 
government to think again about its legislation. In doing so, however, it has sparked the usual 
response about its duty to give way to the elected chamber having fulfilled this role. The 
unintended consequence of leaving the partially reformed House intact is that it does not 
consider its semi-reformed condition to be a drain on legitimacy – rather, it apparently views 
it as nourishing that legitimacy. 
 
It is of course impossible to know whether the House of Lords in an unreformed state (and 
without the promise of reform hanging over it) would have also opposed both pieces of 
legislation. What is perhaps more important is that the Lords’ opposition does raise the 
question about the proper way to resolve disputes of this type between the two chambers. By 
extension, it also highlights the importance of a reform process that engages with reform of 
roles and powers along with composition. If it is accepted that the second chamber performs a 
valuable role in asking government to look again at legislation, then there must be analysis of 
what happens after government has done that. Confrontational shuttling of legislation between 
the two Houses, underpinned by the notion that the Lords should eventually give way to the 
Commons, is a fabulous way to conduct public life from the viewpoint of the political sketch-
writer, but a terrible approach to making laws. A reform strategy that engaged with a 
reassessment of roles and powers along with composition would be able to look at just this 
type of question, possibly in terms of the mediation committees that are used elsewhere 
(Russell 2000:268). Ignoring these important questions, while persisting with attempts to 
reform composition, is only going to result in exploration of these matters being postponed 
until later, and likely resolving them in the midst of crisis between the two chambers. 
 
 
Reform in the Constitutional Long-grass? 
 
Following the inability of the House of Commons to reach a view on the composition of the 
reformed Lords, there was a sense that the issue had been kicked into the constitutional long-
grass, not least because the momentum for change had been lost. The interim House seemed 
unacceptable to many. However, it was unclear whether the government would persist with a 
second stage, or continue with the existing mixture of the Appointments Commission and 
prime ministerial patronage (coupled with the bizarre system of election to replace deceased 
hereditary peers from the reprieved 92 of 1999). The latter certainly seemed like a far easier 
choice, given the energy and time required to achieve reform of any kind.  
 
The use of the Parliament Acts to secure hunting legislation, and the procedural marathon that 
preceded the Prevention of Terrorism Act, have surely demonstrated that the interim House of 
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Lords cannot be considered as lacking in either the independence or expertise required to ask 
the government to think again. Consequently, since the majority of the previous Lords’ 
reforms have been triggered by the sense that the government was not getting its way (or 
could not in future get its way), it is likely that reform will creep to the top of the political 
agenda once more. Although writing prior to the publication of the Labour Party manifesto for 
the 2005 general election, some kind of commitment on Lords’ reform is probable, and so too 
are the chances of reform being prioritised in the next parliament. 
 
Such speculation aside, recent events have demonstrated that it is not only an elected chamber 
that will seek to challenge the government over its legislation. An appointed chamber will do 
the same, and can claim legitimacy for its actions with reference to the process of reform that 
brought it into being. The reform proposals that have been produced since 1997 have made 
various points about the legitimacy of a reformed second chamber. Some have noted how a 
more representationally legitimate chamber can bestow the authority required to enable the 
House to do its job better, and that improved representation can come through an appointment 
process. Others have argued that legitimacy can only come through the democratic route, and 
that a democratically composed chamber would not necessarily be any kind of challenge to 
the Commons. However, the argument made here has been that the reform process itself 
provides legitimacy for the second chamber to become more proactive within the political 
system. Whether the chamber is directly elected or appointed is of course important in terms 
of securing external legitimacy for the chamber, and the arguments for all sides are 
compelling. However, these arguments will have much greater consistency when the issue of 
composition is considered alongside that of roles and powers. Looking only at composition, 
and removing the hereditary peers, has thus far resulted in the unintended consequence that 
the interim House considers itself comprised of sufficient independence, expertise and 
authority to ask government consistently to think again. The problem is that, without the 
accompanying analysis of roles and powers, which would perhaps provide a mechanism for 
use when the two chambers fail to agree, there is no really constructive or efficient way to 
avoid political impasse. To the extent that the government perceives the Lords to be 
challenging its authority, rather than simply performing the vital function of asking it to think 
again, the issue of Lords’ reform is most likely about to be retrieved from the constitutional 
long-grass where it seemed to have been kicked.  
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Appendix – Government defeats in the House of Lords and use of the Parliament Acts. 
 
 
Session  Number of defeats (on division) 
1990-91 17 
1991-92   6  
1992-93 19 
1993-94 16 
1994-95 8 
1995-96 10 
1996-97 10 
1997-98 39 
1998-99 31 
1999-2000 36 
2000-01 2 
2001-02 56 
2002-03 88 
 
Source: House of Commons PIL, ‘Government defeats in the House of Lords since 1970-71’, 
November 2004. 
 
 
Use of Parliament Acts since 1949 
 
War Crimes Act 1991 
European Parliamentary Elections Act 1999 
Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000 
Hunting Act 2004  
 
Source: House of Commons Standard Note, ‘The Parliament Acts’, SN/PC/675, September 
2004. 
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